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Abstract
This letter reviews the scientific literature on whether and how environmental changes affect the
risk of violent conflict. The available evidence from qualitative case studies indicates that
environmental stress can contribute to violent conflict in some specific cases. Results from
quantitative large-N studies, however, strongly suggest that we should be careful in drawing
general conclusions. Those large-N studies that we regard as the most sophisticated ones obtain
results that are not robust to alternative model specifications and, thus, have been debated. This
suggests that environmental changes may, under specific circumstances, increase the risk of
violent conflict, but not necessarily in a systematic way and unconditionally. Hence there is, to
date, no scientific consensus on the impact of environmental changes on violent conflict. This
letter also highlights the most important challenges for further research on the subject. One of
the key issues is that the effects of environmental changes on violent conflict are likely to be
contingent on a set of economic and political conditions that determine adaptation capacity. In
the authors’ view, the most important indirect effects are likely to lead from environmental
changes via economic performance and migration to violent conflict.
Keywords: environmental changes, violent conflict, adaptation, migration
1. Introduction
The assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (2001, 2007) and the Stern review (2006)
conclude that human activity contributes in important ways
to environmental changes. Such changes include temperature
increases, changes in precipitation levels and patterns, rising
sea levels and intensification of natural hazards, such as
storms, floods, droughts and landslides. These climate-related
environmental changes are likely to worsen already existing
environmental problems and thus have serious implications
for humans and nature. For instance, they could cause mass
migrations out of severely affected areas and violent conflict
between and within countries.
Ever since Thomas Malthus published his ‘Essay on the
Principle of Population’ (1798), many policy makers and
scholars have claimed that environmental degradation can
cause violent conflict at the sub-national level and between
states (e.g. Ban 2007, Homer-Dixon 1994). Systematic
scientific assessment of this claim is rather recent, however:
a considerable body of scientific and policy-oriented literature
on environmental conflicts has emerged only in the past two
decades.
In this letter, we take stock of the scientific literature
on the subject. In principle, it would be very helpful to
know what kinds of environmental changes have what kinds
of influences on what kinds of conflict. Our letter essay
shows, however, that the existing literature is still far from
offering differentiated answers to these questions. Current
theorizing and empirical research in fact focuses on the broader
question of whether environmental changes increase the risk
of violent conflict, and the answer remains strongly debated.
Based on what we regard as the most sophisticated studies
on the subject, we conclude that there is no systematic and
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direct causal relationship between environmental degradation
and violent conflict; rather, the effect of environmental changes
on violent conflict appears to be contingent on a set of
intervening economic and political factors that determine
adaptation capacity (e.g. Koubi et al 2012, Salehyan 2008a,
Buhaug et al 2008, Kahl 2006, Martin 2005).
We review the existing literature on the environmental–
conflict nexus along the following lines. First, we
outline and compare the arguments of the ‘neo-Malthusian’
and ‘cornucopian’ perspectives. This section emphasizes
possible causal mechanisms linking environmental changes
and conflict. Second, we review empirical studies on the
subject. In doing so, we concentrate on large-N research
because we believe that, in order to be regarded as scientifically
robust and generalizable, arguments about the environment–
conflict nexus ultimately have to pass such testing. Third, we
highlight data shortcomings and common analytical problems
in existing research and offer our assessments of these. By
implication, this section accounts for why empirical findings
have been contradictory so far. We conclude by pointing to the
main avenues for further research.
2. Neo-Malthusian versus cornucopian arguments
One group of scholars, frequently referred to as ‘neo-
Malthusians’, claims that environmental changes pose a
severe and direct threat to security because of their potential
to increase resource scarcity3. Homer-Dixon for instance
argues that decreasing access to renewable resources increases
frustration, which in turn creates grievances against the
state, weakens the state and civil society and increases the
opportunity for instigating an insurrection. He identifies
three types of environmental scarcity: (1) supply induced
scarcity, i.e. reduced availability of renewable resources due
to consumption and degradation that develop faster than
regeneration processes; (2) demand induced scarcity, which
is a consequence of population growth and/or increased
consumption per capita; and (3) structural scarcity caused by
an unequal distribution of access to natural resources (Homer-
Dixon 1994, 1999).
These three components interact and reinforce each other,
resulting in two social processes labelled as ‘resource capture’
and ‘ecological marginalization’. The former occurs when
resource depletion and population growth induce unequal
access to resources. In such cases, powerful state elites—
attempting to secure resources that may become scarce in the
future—manipulate a country’s policies in their own favour.
This weakens institutional responses to social grievances and
increases the risk of violent conflict. The latter process
occurs when unequal resource access and population growth
affect resource degradation and depletion. Under those
circumstances, groups facing resource scarcity may migrate
3 Some scholars have argued that local abundance of natural resources can
contribute to violent conflict as well (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 1998, Ross
2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Le Billon 2001). This work, which remains
very much contested (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, de Soysa 2002a, 2002b,
Cramer 2002), is less relevant in our context because it deals with extraction
of high value resources, for instance oil, gold or diamonds, rather than
environmental changes.
Figure 1. Environmental scarcity and violent conflict.
into areas that are already ecologically stressed. This increases
the risk of violence between natives and newcomers4. Figure 1
summarizes these mechanisms. While subsequent research has
led to some refinements of these mechanisms (e.g. Buhaug
et al 2008), figure 1 still represents the baseline model for neo-
Malthusian environment–conflict arguments.
Cornucopians are ‘resource optimists’. They do not share
the pessimistic neo-Malthusian view. They acknowledge that
environmental changes may periodically put human well-being
at risk. But they also claim that humans are and will be
able to adapt to resource scarcities either through market
mechanisms, technological innovations, social institutions for
resource allocation or any combination thereof (Lomborg
2001, Simon 1989, 1996). Simon (1996), for example, argues
that mankind will be able to respond to new circumstances
imposed by environmental changes through improvements in
technology and efficiency—although he admits that population
growth may lead to resource shortages or increased economic
burdens in the short run. In the same vein, cornucopians
criticize neo-Malthusian arguments as overly deterministic and
ignorant of economic and socio-political factors (e.g. Gleditsch
1998, Matthew and Gaulin 2000, de Soysa 2002a, 2002b,
Barnett and Adger 2007, Salehyan 2008a, Koubi et al 2012).5
Resource optimists suggest various causal mechanisms in
which scarcity of resources is just one of several key factors
in the overall relationship between environmental changes and
violent conflict. In those explanatory models, cooperation
between resource users is a distinct possibility for mitigating
and/or adapting to resource scarcity. In other words, even
if environmental changes exacerbate resource scarcity, violent
conflict is not a foregone conclusion. Moreover, even if violent
conflict occurs, resource scarcity is unlikely to be the main
cause although it may be present in the respective case.
3. Empirical evidence
Much of the existing empirical work on the environment–
conflict nexus relies on qualitative case studies of specific
4 Many neo-Malthusian arguments are in fact motivated by observations of
low-intensity communal disputes over scarce natural resources.
5 Most cornucopians do not believe that resource scarcity leads to major
violent conflict, but they do concede that smaller-scale violent conflict over
scarce resources is possible, though not unavoidable. Hence the main
disagreement between neo-Malthusians and cornucopians appears to concern
primarily the deterministic character of the neo-Malthusian argument and the
expected frequency of larger-scale violent conflict.
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countries or regions. Many of these studies have been
undertaken by the Toronto Group’s Environmental Change
and Acute Conflict Project (ECACP), and the Environmental
Conflicts Project (ENCOP) at ETH Zurich. They provide
evidence that environmental scarcity has been a contributing
factor in recent conflicts. Examples include violence in
South Africa, the insurgency in Assam, the Zapatista rebellion
in Chiapas (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994, 1999, Percival and
Homer-Dixon 1998, Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998), as well
as conflicts in Sudan, the Middle East and Nigeria (Baechler
1998, Spillman 1995, Baechler et al 1996).6
This research has produced important insights into the
pathways that may link environmental conditions and conflict.
However, social and political implications of environmental
changes are likely to vary considerably between different types
of environmental changes (e.g. water scarcity, floods, soil
degradation, deforestation, etc) as well as areas and societies
of the world. Most of the case studies literature on the
environment–conflict relationship uses a ‘grounded theory’
approach; theoretical arguments are developed inductively,
based on in-depth analysis of individual cases. Alternatively,
case studies are also used to illustrate, rather than to test,
theoretical arguments. Qualitative case studies are, therefore,
very useful for theory development and illustration, and for
providing an in-depth understanding of particular events. But
they need to be complemented by quantitative research in order
to arrive at robust and generalizable findings with respect to
the key issue of concern: whether environmental changes do
(rather than can) increase the risk of violent conflict. Hence
the remainder of this section concentrates on the recent wave
of empirical large-N research. It is structured according to
conflict types, i.e. inter- versus intrastate conflict, and also
considers the environmental conditions (water scarcity, land
degradation, deforestation, climatic changes, etc) under study.
With regard to interstate conflict, most of the existing
quantitative work focuses on the effects of water scarcity
on the probability of conflict while controlling for other
determinants7. Hauge and Ellingsen (2001) and Gleick (1993)
provide some evidence that water scarcity can lead to armed
conflict. In addition, systematic empirical analyses suggest that
transboundary waters are associated with low-level conflicts,
but not with full-scale ‘water wars’ (e.g. Gleditsch and Hegre
2000, Toset et al 2000, Gleditsch et al 2006, Hensel et al 2006,
Brochmann and Hensel 2009, Dinar 2009, Dinar et al 2011). In
contrast to these studies, Kalbhenn (2012), Dinar et al (2007),
Wolf (2002), and Yoffe et al (2003) report that states tend to
cooperate rather than fight over their shared water resources,
and most international water conflicts are not full-scale wars,
but rather diplomatic tensions8.
6 Moran (2011) discusses the effects climate change is likely to have on 42
countries and regions until 2030, including the USA, the EU, China, India,
Brazil and Southern Africa.
7 Tir and Diehl (1998) examine the impact of population growth and density
(the standard proxy for the neo-Malthusian resource pressure) on militarized
interstate disputes (MIDs) onset from 1930 to 1989. They find a positive
relationship between population growth and the risk of MIDs, but the
results offer no evidence that population density affects conflict involvement,
initiation or escalation.
8 Similarly, Gartzke (2012) shows that climatic changes—in particular the rise
in global temperature—did not lead to an increase in interstate conflict.
With regard to intrastate conflict, Hauge and Ellingsen
(1998) examine the effects of land degradation, freshwater
scarcity, population density9 and deforestation on intrastate
conflict in 1980–1992. They find that all these factors have
direct and positive effects on the incidence of conflict. Theisen
(2008) shows, however, that the results of Hauge and Ellingsen
(1998) cannot be replicated even with the original data. In
his own analysis, Theisen (2008) finds that only a very high
level of land degradation increases the risk of civil war.
He concludes that ‘scarcity of natural resources has limited
explanatory power in terms of civil violence’ (Theisen 2008).10
Raleigh and Urdal (2007) and Hendrix and Glaser (2007)
study how factors presumably related to climate change, such
as land degradation and freshwater availability, affect the
likelihood of civil conflict in Africa. They find that only
water scarcity significantly increases the likelihood of conflict.
Hendrix and Glaser (2007) also examine the impact of short-
term climatic changes (inter-annual variability in rainfall) on
civil conflict onset in sub-Saharan Africa. They report that
positive changes in rainfall significantly decrease the conflict
risk in the following year.
Hsiang et al (2011) study the impact of planetary-scale
climatic changes on civil conflict and show that the ‘probability
of new civil conflicts arising throughout the tropics doubles
during El Nin˜o years relative to La Nin˜a years.’ Similarly,
Burke et al (2009) find that temperature increases in Africa
between 1981 and 2002 have a significantly positive effect on
civil war onset. They report that a 1 ◦C temperature increase
boosts the risk of civil war by 4.5% points during the same
year. Buhaug (2010), on the other hand, shows that this
result is not robust to alternative model specifications. He also
finds that climate variability, measured as inter-annual growth
and deviation from annual mean precipitation and temperature,
does not predict civil conflict. In the same vein, Theisen et al
(2012), using various drought measures while controlling for
socio-political characteristics such as politically marginalized
population, do not find any effect of drought on civil conflict
in Africa. They conclude that the critical determinant of civil
conflict is the extent of political and economic marginalization
of ethnic groups rather than environmental issues (see also
Raleigh 2010). Also, Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010) do not find
any significant effect of rainfall growth on civil war onset.
Brancati (2007) and Nel and Righarts (2008) examine
the impact of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, volcanic
eruption, tsunami, etc, on intrastate conflict. They find
that natural disasters significantly increase the risk of civil
conflict, especially in countries with a lower gross domestic
product, sluggish economic growth, mixed political regimes
and preexisting conflicts. Nel and Righarts (2008) concede,
however, that different dynamics apply to minor as compared
9 Note that several authors (e.g. Raleigh and Urdal 2007, Urdal 2005, de Soysa
2002a, 2002b) report a significant positive influence of population density on
domestic armed conflict. But others (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Hegre and
Sambanis 2006) do not find any effect. Overall, the existing findings offer only
weak empirical support for the neo-Malthusian population pressure–conflict
argument.
10 Similarly, the US State Failure Task Force Project did not find a significant,
direct relationship between indicators of environmental scarcity and various
types of state failure—including civil war (Esty et al 1998).
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to major conflicts. This somewhat limits the generalizability
of their results. In this context, Bergholt and Lujala (2012)
investigate the economic consequences of natural disasters and
how these may be linked to civil conflict. They do not find
support for the argument that the negative effect of disasters
on economic growth increases the likelihood of armed civil
conflicts.
Binningsbo et al (2007) use the ecological footprint
index (Rees 1992)—a popular measure of environmental
sustainability—as a measure of environmental scarcity/
degradation. They find that increasing a country’s ecological
footprint reduces the risk of violent conflict. This result
cuts against neo-Malthusian claims, suggesting that higher per
capita consumption of natural resources is associated with
lower probability of violent conflict. They conclude that
this finding is consistent with a liberal perspective on armed
conflict: as people become wealthier, they have more to lose
from violence and, consequently, will try harder to avoid it.
In summary, in its attempts to identify whether
environmental changes contribute to violent conflict, existing
research has, thus far, arrived at contradictory findings. These
contradictory results stem primarily from differences across
studies in: (a) the type of conflict under study; (b) differences
in the type of environmental changes whose effect is examined;
and (c) differences in country samples and time-periods. With
a view to the saying that ‘absence of evidence does not
necessarily mean evidence of absence’, we should not jump
to the conclusion that the neo-Malthusian claim is empirically
false, and that, by implication, the cornucopians are right. The
main reason, as discussed in section 4, is that several important
analytical problems remain to be solved.
4. Problems in existing empirical research
Qualitative case studies have shown that environmental
changes played a role in several, mostly small-scale and local
violent conflicts in various parts of the world. Still, larger-scale
comparisons—including comparisons with cases in which
environmental changes have not led to violent conflict—are
clearly needed in order to arrive at general conclusions with
respect to the neo-Malthusian versus cornucopian debate.
As demonstrated in section 3, however, large-N quantitative
research has produced interesting, yet rather contradictory
findings. In fact, the findings discussed above are not robust to
alternative model specifications. Hence there is no consensus
on the impact of environmental changes on conflict. We believe
that several analytical problems are likely to be the reason
for that. In this section we highlight what we regard as the
most important research challenges and then focus in detail on
the issue of indirect effects and endogeneity in the subsequent
section.
First, there is a lack of issue coding in existing conflict
data—these data capture the outcome to be explained. That
is, existing studies do not explicitly identify whether the
issue over which a violent conflict broke out is related to
environmental changes. They merely infer causal effects
of environmental changes on conflict by identifying partial
coefficients on environmental variables in regression models
(e.g. Bernauer and Kalbhenn 2010). The most promising
solution to this lacuna lies in the coding of time-series
cross-sectional event data that identify conflict events also in
terms of their likely trigger11. Existing data that could be
useful in this respect focus exclusively on international river-
basin conflicts and cooperation (transboundary freshwater
dispute database (TFDD); Kalbhenn and Bernauer 2012; issue
correlates of war project). In addition, a recent data coding
project offers quantitative information on domestic water
conflict/cooperation in the Mediterranean and Sahel areas
(Bernauer et al 2011).12 Extensions to environmental conflicts
more broadly would be very useful.
Second, conflict data that are commonly used for large-
N studies of the environment–conflict nexus, notably the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the Correlates of
War (COW) data, only capture rather high-intensity conflict
events. The UCDP/PRIO data, for instance, define conflicts
as violent events that involve government actors on at least one
side of the conflict, and the data record only those conflicts
with 25 or more battle deaths per year. Although there
is much merit in focusing on high-intensity violent conflict,
this approach still leaves aside other types of conflict events,
such as demonstrations, riots and various forms of communal
violence not involving state actors. The Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data (ACLED) provide information on
communal conflicts, albeit only for Africa and the time period
1997–2010. A new dataset, the Social Conflict in Africa
Database (SCAD), provides highly useful information on low
levels of violence in African countries (e.g. demonstrations
and riots) in recent years13. We believe that the absence of
sufficient data on low-intensity non-state conflict is likely to
be one important reason why existing quantitative research
does not offer much insight into what kinds of environmental
changes have what kinds of influences on what kinds of conflict
or cooperation. Specifically, violent conflicts, as measured
by existing datasets, are extremely rare events. Hence there
is a problem of over-determination, which makes it very hard
to identify whether particular environmental stress factors are
associated with particular types of conflicts. Moreover, the lack
of issue coding in existing conflict datasets means that we have
far too little information on the distribution of conflicts across
particular kinds of environmental stress factors.
Third, better data for differentiating local environmental
conditions are needed. Researchers often patch together
various data from different localities in a country to construct
a national environmental-pressure average, which in turn
11 While issue coding is very useful in principle, it can be difficult in some
cases to identify and isolate what the ‘issue’ in question really is. For example,
it might be difficult in some cases to identify what the ‘real’ drivers of
individual episodes of violence are, and to separate structural from proximate
causes. While a violent conflict over access to water appears like an easy
case for issue coding, environmental determinants may be less obvious in
other violent events. To mitigate this and related problems, issue coding
can be accompanied by qualitative case studies that can provide an in-depth
understanding of particular events.
12 See also Bernauer et al (2011) for a discussion of difficulties associated with
issue coding.
13 Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) use the SCAD data to investigate the effect
of deviations from normal rainfall patterns on civil conflict as well as civil
unrest during the last twenty years. They find that wetter and drier than normal
conditions are associated with both civil conflict and civil unrest.
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Figure 2. Indirect effects of environmental changes on conflict and
cooperation.
is correlated with conflict data. Because environmental
conditions may vary strongly across different locations within
countries, such averaging is likely to lead to biased and
potentially wrong results (Jensen and Gleditsch 2009; see also
Theisen et al 2012). For example, assume there is strong
environmental degradation in two locations within a country,
and a violent conflict occurs in each of those locations. If there
is no environmental degradation anywhere else in the country,
the national average environmental condition would be benign
and we would not observe a correlation between environmental
degradation and conflict. Fixing this data problem will
require intense cooperation between environmental scientists
and conflict researchers.
Yet another problem in existing empirical research is that
it does not adequately deal with endogeneity among conflict
and environmental changes. That is, the majority of studies
empirically measures environmental changes in terms of water
scarcity, soil erosion, land degradation or deforestation. The
problem with those indicators is that they are likely to be
endogenous to conflict as well as other types of human activity,
i.e. economic and political factors. This means that the causal
arrow may not (only) run from environmental changes to
conflict, but may also point in the opposite direction (Koubi
et al 2012, Buhaug et al 2008, Salehyan 2008a, Miguel et al
2004, Gleditsch 1998).
Moreover, several authors (e.g. Koubi et al 2012, Buhaug
et al 2008, Salehyan 2008a) emphasize that existing studies
focus primarily on a direct link between environmental
changes and conflict. Conditional effects that could result
from economic and political factors have been discussed in
the qualitative case studies literature. But they have, so
far and perhaps surprisingly, been neglected in quantitative
studies on the environment–conflict nexus. This research
gap is problematic because, for instance, ignoring the role of
governments in managing and redistributing scarce resources
could easily lead to wrong ex post conclusions, predictions or
policy prescriptions. Section 5 concentrates on this issue.
5. Research priorities
We contend that indirect effects between environmental
changes and violent conflict cannot be ignored (figure 2), and
that empirical analyses of indirect effects are required to further
substantiate these indirect causal pathways.
Notably, future studies should consider that economic and
political factors are likely to mediate effects that environmental
changes may have on the risk of conflict. Such research on
indirect effects will in fact address the cornucopian claim.
The latter emphasizes the adaptive capacity of societies facing
conditions of environmental and resource scarcity.
Gizelis and Wooden (2010) and Koubi et al (2012)
argue that economic conditions and political institutions affect
the distribution of and access to environmental resources.
Political systems and economic conditions can respond to
the pressure of natural and structural scarcity in this context.
Conflict may, therefore, not always occur in nations that suffer
from droughts, temperature increases or water scarcity, and
‘in fact, the modal tendency may be for it not to occur’
(Gizelis and Wooden 2010: 446). Gizelis and Wooden
(2010) emphasize and empirically find evidence that these
factors have the ability to effectively alleviate grievances and
help societies adapt to environmental changes. In other
words, some countries are better endowed with economic
resources and technological capabilities than others and are
therefore better able to cope with environmental stress through
effective adaptation policies. Similarly, some countries
may have responsive and effective governments as well as
superior political institutions—characteristics that are usually
associated with mature democracies. Such states will find it
easier to deal with environmental changes. Democracies in
particular are thus likely to perform better in avoiding conflict
over scarce resources. In effect, several studies have identified
a significantly positive relationship between democracy and
environmental performance (e.g. Bernauer and Koubi 2009, Li
and Reuveny 2006).
In our view, the most important indirect effects are
likely to lead from environmental changes via economic
performance and migration to violent conflict. Several studies
empirically support the stylized fact that poor economic
performance—either temporary or persistent—breeds violent
conflict (e.g. Blattman and Miguel 2010, Hegre and Sambanis
2006, Miguel et al 2004, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004,
Fearon and Laitin 2003, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Hess
and Orphanidis 1995, Russett 1987). If environmental
changes, such as temperature increases or decreases, strong
deviations in precipitation patterns, or increased water
scarcity reduce economic welfare, then conflict could become
more likely. Recent empirical work has made first steps
in addressing these indirect effects between environmental
changes, economic performance and the risk of conflict.
Zhang et al (2007) find evidence that climatic changes affect
conflict through their effects on agricultural productivity
over the period 1400–1900. Miguel et al (2004) study 41
African countries from 1981 to 1999 and find that negative
rainfall growth rates reduce national economic growth, and
thereby indirectly increase the likelihood of civil war onset14.
Hidalgo et al (2010), using a panel dataset with over 50 000
municipality-year observations, show that land invasions by
the rural poor in Brazil occur immediately after adverse
economic shocks, which are instrumented by rainfall in the
statistical analysis.
14 Ciccone (2011) re-evaluates the Miguel et al (2004) findings using rainfall
levels instead of rainfall growth rates. He reports that lower rainfall levels are
associated with a lower probability of civil conflict.
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In addition to affecting economic performance, environ-
mental changes and degradation could contribute to human
migration by pushing people out of adversely affected or
uninhabitable areas. Existing studies indicate that internal
and international migration is a frequently observed coping
response to drought, desertification, water scarcity, sea level
rise and other environmental pressures (Laczko and Aghazarm
2009, Henry et al 2004, Knerr 2004, Tamondong-Helin
and Helin 1991). Furthermore, existing work suggests
that environmentally induced migration can lead to conflict
in receiving areas because of competition for scarce re-
sources and economic opportunities, ethnic tensions when
migrants are from different ethnic groups, and exacerbation of
socioeconomic ‘fault lines’ (Raleigh et al 2008). Similarly,
Gleditsch et al (2008: 487; see also Salehyan 2008b, Salehyan
and Gleditsch 2006, Sandler 2004: 201) point to spill-over
effects, in the sense that mass refugee migration creates
new tensions in neighbouring or other receiving states by
imposing an economic burden and causing political instability.
Eventually, such spillovers can become militarized when states
close their borders or take other measures to prevent conflict
transmissions. For example, Reuveny (2007) examines the
impact of environmental problems on migration and conflict
in a study of 38 migration cases in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America over the past few decades. His results show that
environmental migration does not necessarily induce violent
behaviour; but when it does so, environmentally motivated
migration seems to intensify intrastate and interstate disputes
alike. Suhrke (1993), on the other hand, contends that whether
or not environmentally induced migration leads to conflict in
receiving areas depends on the capacity of the state to accom-
modate the needs and alleviate the grievances of migrants and
locals alike. It is important to note, however, that it is very
challenging to isolate the different causes of migration, and to
identify whether specific population movements occurred as a
direct result of environmental changes. Furthermore, the lack
of systematic data on the impact of environmental degradation
on migration and on the effects of environmentally induced
migration on conflict is a strong impediment to research on
this issue (Laczko and Aghazarm 2009). Consequently, the
link between environmentally induced migration and conflict
remains speculative.
We submit that environmentally induced economic
hardship and migration is likely to lead to violent conflict
primarily in or between those states where political institutions
and conflict resolution mechanisms are either missing, have
failed, or are weak (Skaperdas 2003, 1992, Garfinkel 1994,
Suhrke 1993, Haavelmo 1954). Koubi et al (2012), using
global data for the period 1950–2004, find some evidence
that non-democratic countries are more likely to experience
civil wars when climatic conditions—measured as deviation of
the current level of precipitation and temperature from their
past long run average levels—lead to economic downturns.
Similarly, Gizelis and Wooden (2010) find some support for
the argument that water scarcity is less likely to be associated
with intrastate conflict in democracies.
With a view to the latter findings, and also in view
of policy debates on appropriate adaptation policies, future
research should focus much more on the role of political and
economic factors in mediating the effect of environmental
changes on violent conflict. In addition, at the methodological
level, future research should deal with the endogeneity of
conflict to economic crisis and political institutions. The scarce
empirical evidence we have to date suggests that reduced levels
of domestic economic activity tend to create incentives for
increased external and internal violent conflict, which in turn
depresses domestic economic activity (Blomberg et al 2006,
Blomberg and Hess 2002). Such effects point to a potential
‘poverty–conflict nexus.’ They have to be taken into account
in empirical analyses that focus on the entire ‘environment–
poverty–conflict nexus.’
6. Conclusion
As noted in section 1, policy makers and scholars alike would
like to know what kinds of environmental changes have what
kinds of influences on what kinds of conflict or cooperation.
Our letter of existing research demonstrates, however, that
there is no consensus in the scientific literature on what the
answers to these questions should be.
We have shown that current theorizing and empirical
research focuses primarily on the broader question of whether
environmental changes increase the risk of violent conflict, as
predicted by the neo-Malthusian perspective. The available
empirical evidence, notably the evidence from qualitative case
studies, shows that environmental stress can contribute to
violent conflict in some specific cases. The evidence from
quantitative large-N studies strongly suggests, however, that
we should be very careful in drawing general conclusions from
location- and time-specific case-study results. Particularly
those large-N studies that we regard as the most sophisticated
ones find that the effects of environmental changes on violent
conflict, examined for a large population of countries and
locations over long time-periods, are not robust to alternative
model specifications. Overall, the existing evidence suggests
that environmental changes may, under specific circumstances,
increase the risk of violent conflict—but do not systematically
do so. Our letter also highlights what we consider the most
important problems that further research should deal with.
Data gaps, particularly with respect to information
on conflicts, environmental problems and environmentally
induced migration, loom large. The main gaps pertain to issue
coding of conflict events and data for lower-intensity non-
state conflicts. Similar problems exist with respect to spatially
resolved data on environmental conditions. Such shortcomings
constitute a key reason why scientific research cannot, at
present, identify whether particular types of environmental
changes are systematically associated with particular types of
conflict or cooperation.
Another key challenge is to empirically identify indirect
and conditional effects of environmental changes on violent
conflict. Systematic consideration of intervening variables,
such as economic and political conditions, which are very
much emphasized by the cornucopian perspective and are to
some extent also considered in the qualitative case studies
literature, are crucial in this context. Recent large-N
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research has begun to address this issue more systematically
(e.g. Koubi et al 2012, Gizelis and Wooden 2010, Buhaug
et al 2008, Salehyan 2008a, Miguel et al 2004). We believe
that significant progress towards resolving these analytical
problems is possible on the basis of existing datasets and that
these analytical solutions can then fruitfully be applied to new
environmental as well as conflict data as they become available.
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